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LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAW IN THE IMF 
AND THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
John W. Head∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION: “WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?” 
In this article I offer a possible framework for our discussions (both 
written and verbal) in the Journal-sponsored Fall 2007 Symposium on “Law 
and Policy in International Financial Institutions.”  I am pleased to have been 
helping to organize the symposium, mainly because the issues at play are both 
intrinsically interesting and vitally important to the future of global economic 
relations, and I wish to thank and compliment the Journal staff, particularly 
John Foote, for fine work in organizing the symposium and for publishing the 
participants’ presentations.1 
I begin with some “stage-setting” points.  In the following few paragraphs 
I shall briefly identify the international financial institutions (“IFIs”) under 
discussion in the symposium as well as some key elements of the historical and 
legal context in which they now find themselves.  I shall also provide a 
“nutshell” enumeration of the specific issues to be addressed in later sections 
of this article. 
In doing so, and indeed throughout this article, I shall be painting with a 
 
∗  Professor of Law, University of Kansas since 1990.  Before beginning an academic 
career, Mr. Head practiced law in the Washington, D.C. office of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and 
Hamilton, and served as counsel for both the Asian Development Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.  He teaches in the areas of international law, international business, and 
comparative law.  He has written and consulted widely on these subjects. 
1. In particular, I greatly appreciate the cooperation and flexibility of the Journal staff in 
terms of formatting matters relating to the symposium contributions, several of which (including 
this article) appear more in the character of essays than traditional law-journal articles.  This 
approach reflects the main purpose of a symposium:  to emphasize the easy exchange of ideas 
among experts rather than providing extensive citation to authority that non-experts would need.  
While I am thanking people, I also wish to thank Alexandra Lasley English and Katie Lula for 
their valuable assistance in the preparation of this article, and to express my appreciation also to 
Lucia Orth and to my colleagues and fellow participants in the symposium for offering helpful 
comments and suggestions.  As usual, research assistance from the University of Kansas General 
Research Fund is also gratefully acknowledged. 
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broad brush.  My aim is to identify, based on my engagement in this area for 
over a quarter of a century, a handful of issues in order to stimulate discussions 
regarding the role of law in IFIs.  I shall not attempt an in-depth analysis of 
those issues.  In view of this approach, and with the kind permission of the 
Journal editors, I shall provide only rather sparse citations to authority but 
shall instead refer to some of the many books and other sources where such 
citations may easily be found. 
A. IFIs in a Changing World 
The IFIs under discussion in this symposium are the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the five main multilateral development banks 
(“MDBs”), of which the World Bank is the most prominent.  General 
information about these IFIs—their creation, their operations, their structures, 
and so forth—abounds in books, articles, websites, and elsewhere,2 so I need 
 
2. For a sampling of such information, see generally JAMES M. BOUGHTON & K. SARWAR 
LATEEF EDS., FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS: THE FUTURE OF THE IMF AND THE 
WORLD BANK (1995); THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK AT SIXTY (ARIEL BUIRA, ED., 2005); 
Erik Denters, International Monetary Fund, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS (R. 
BLANPAIN ED., 1993); ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY (1996); 
RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION (1985); JOHN W. 
HEAD, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS: AN EVALUATION OF 
CRITICISMS LEVELED AT THE IMF, THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, AND THE WTO 
(2005) [hereinafter FUTURE OF THE GEOS]; John W. Head, Asian Development Bank, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYLOPAEDIA OF LAWS (R. BLANPAIN ED., 2002); INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE IMF (IMF Pamphlet 
Series No. 45, 2d ed. 1991); PETER ISARD, GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2005); HAROLD JAMES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 
SINCE BRETTON WOODS (1996); PETER B. KENEN ED., MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: 
FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS (1995); SIGRIN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2001); 
REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (EDWIN M. TRUMAN, ED., 2006); DAVID VINES 
AND CHRISTOPHER L. GILBERT, THE IMF AND ITS CRITICS: REFORM OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE (2004); NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND 
THEIR BORROWERS (2006); John W. Head, For Richer or For Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms 
Directed at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (2004); John W. Head, 
Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary Fund, 52 
U. KAN. L. REV. 521 (2004); John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward 
Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of “International” Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
605 (1994) [hereinafter Supranational Law]; Ross B. Leckow, The International Monetary Fund 
and Strengthening the Architecture of the International Monetary System, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 117 (1999); Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and the Role of 
International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
71 (2000); Ngaire Woods, Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable, 77 INT’L 
AFF. 83 (2001). Extensive information about the IFIs is also available, of course, on their 
websites.  These are www.imf.org (for the IMF), www.worldbank.org (for the World Bank), 
www.adb.org (for the Asian Development Bank), www.afdb.org (for the African Development 
Bank), www.iadb.org (for the Inter-American Development Bank), and www.ebrd.org (for the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).  These institutions are all described in the 
following few paragraphs. 
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offer only a brief synopsis here.3 
• The International Monetary Fund.  The IMF, formed at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944, began its existence as the international supervisor 
of a system of fixed currency exchange rates (the “par value system”)—a 
system whose overall aim would be to facilitate increased international trade 
by resisting competitive currency devaluations among countries.  That fixed-
currency-rate system broke down in the 1970s, and since that time the IMF has 
been most evident as a financing institution for countries facing heavy external 
debts and facing financial or economic crises.  Nearly all countries are IMF 
members, but the wealthiest members do not borrow from it now.  Among 
those countries that do borrow from the IMF, some are eligible for very low-
cost loans.  These are sometimes referred to as “soft” loans or “concessional” 
loans, because of their longer maturities and almost zero interest, and they are 
made from funds that are contributed by the wealthiest member countries.  The 
other (and significantly larger) category of loans that the IMF makes are 
“hard” loans, with market-based interest rates; the funds for them come from 
resources provided by all members in the form of capital subscriptions that 
reflect each member’s “quota,” or share, in the IMF.  This “quota” system also 
governs voting power, and the dramatic differences in voting power between 
the USA—whose “quota” gives it control over about seventeen percent of the 
total votes—and the dozens of countries that have less than one percent of the 
total votes makes the “weighted voting system” a subject of frequent 
criticism.4 
• The World Bank.  Nearly all countries in the world also belong to the 
World Bank, which technically consists of two legally distinct entities: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) and the 
International Development Association (“IDA”).  The IBRD was formed 
alongside the IMF at Bretton Woods in 1944,5 mainly to finance post-war 
reconstruction in Europe.  A decade and a half later the IDA was established6 
to provide lower-cost financing to economically less developed countries 
 
3. The following synopsis draws heavily from FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 3-4, 
22-28, 30-34, 44-46.  Citations may be found there to numerous other sources of authority and 
sources for research into further details. 
4. Some of the best and most detailed information on the IMF can be found in the various 
works written by one of the participants in this symposium, Rich Edwards, whose treatise 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION set the standard for other authors’ work in this 
area.  See generally Edwards, supra note 2; see also Denters, supra note 2.  The IMF’s structure 
and operations are governed by the IMF charter—that is, the treaty under which the IMF was 
established in 1944—as it has been amended since then.  For full citations to, and the current text 
of, the IMF charter, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 19 n.5, 22 n.12, and 253-310, 
respectively.  For a “nutshell” account of the IMF and its operations, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, 
supra note 2, at 22-30. 
5. Like the IMF, the IBRD is governed by its charter as prepared in 1944 and amended 
since then.  For full citations to, and the current text of, the IBRD charter, see FUTURE OF THE 
GEOS, supra note 2, at 19 n.6, 30 n.43, and 311-339, respectively. 
6. For further information on the IDA, and citations to and the current text of its charter, see 
FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 30-46, 31 n.44, and 341-363, respectively. 
3- HEAD-FORMATTED.3.DOC                                                                  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2008  2:48:56 PM 
2008] HEAD: LAW AND POLICY IN IFIs 197 
(“LDCs”), which rocketed to prominence with the demise of colonial holdings 
by European powers.  For most practical purposes, the IBRD and the IDA 
operate as one institution, and they undertake mainly public-sector project 
lending—that is, lending to national governments (or government agencies) to 
finance the building of roads, irrigation systems, hospitals, power plants, 
schools, and the like.7  In the last quarter-century, however, the World Bank 
has also engaged in another kind of lending: policy-based lending (sometimes 
referred to as “structural adjustment” lending) that is not tied to specific 
projects but instead provides financial support for policy initiatives taken by 
the government of a country—not unlike the kind of lending the IMF 
undertakes.  Moreover, also like the IMF, the World Bank provides both 
“hard” loans and “soft” loans.  The IBRD makes the “hard” loans, the 
resources for which come mainly from the proceeds of a vigorous IBRD 
borrowing program on public financial markets worldwide.  The “soft” loans 
(fewer in number and overall volume) come from the IDA, drawing from 
resources that are contributed by the wealthiest countries. 
• The regional multilateral development banks.  The IBRD and the IDA 
are multilateral development banks (“MDBs”) in that they muster funds on a 
multilateral basis to help finance projects designed to aid economic 
development.  Complementing the work of the IBRD and the IDA, and using 
those institutions as their models, are four main regional development banks.  
Three were formed in the 1960s: the Inter-American Development Bank 
(“IADB”), the African Development Bank (“AfDB”), and the Asian 
Development Bank (“ADB”).  A fourth, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (“EBRD”) was established in 1990.8  Like the IBRD and the 
IDA, the regional MDBs engage in both project lending and policy-based 
lending.  Under varying institutional arrangements, most of the regional MDBs 
also provide both “hard” loans and “soft” loans, with “hard” loans funded 
through borrowing programs and “soft” loans funded through contributions 
made by the wealthiest member countries.  The most obvious difference 
between the regional MDBs and the World Bank are the geography-based 
limitations that apply in the case of the regional MDBs: they carry out their 
financing operations only in their specific regions.  However, membership in 
the regional MDBs is open not only to countries of their specific regions but 
 
7. Another institution, the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), was established in the 
late 1950s to provide financing (both debt and equity) to private-sector borrowers, as opposed to 
governments and government agencies.  The IFC is an affiliate of the World Bank, in that it has 
close institutional ties to it.  So are two other institutions formed in the 1960s and the 1980s, 
respectively:  the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).  These three affiliates of the World 
Bank, plus the two entities that comprise the World Bank itself (that is, the IBRD and the IDA) 
are officially referred to collectively as “the World Bank Group.”  For purposes of this article, 
and the symposium to which it contributes, the IFC, the ICSID, and the MIGA are of only 
tangential interest. 
8. For further information about these four regional MDBs—along with citations to (and 
texts of) their charters—see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 30-46 and 365-510. 
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also to wealthy countries from outside their regions.  The incentives for such 
wealthy countries to join the regional development banks (and indeed to join 
the World Bank itself) include these: (i) membership by a country in an MDB 
makes private-sector contractors and suppliers of that country eligible to bid on 
construction and supply contracts required for the projects financed by the 
MDB; and (ii) membership by a country in an MDB gives that country’s 
government some influence in the economic and financial policy decisions 
made by the MDB. 
In earlier writings I have urged that we regard the MDBs—that is, the 
World Bank and the regional MDBs—as comprising three “generations.”9  As 
I expressed it recently: 
 [The MDBs] were established at different times, reflecting 
changing needs and influences.  In my view, the MDBs should be 
viewed as “generational” in character, with three generations now 
having run their course, or nearly so.  The first generation is 
represented by the IBRD, born in the closing days of World War II 
with the reconstruction of Europe as its main priority [hence the 
inclusion of the “R” (for “Reconstruction”) in the name of the 
IBRD]. . . .  [T]he fact that the U.S. government soon took over the 
bulk of that task under the Marshall Plan prompted (in part) the 
IBRD to [abandon that aim of reconstruction and to] focus its 
attention more on the “D” in IBRD—that is, economic development 
in its non-European member countries. 
 A second generation began around 1960 to cater better to the 
needs of LDCs.  With the rapid emergence of many new states 
following the massive decolonization of the 1940s and 1950s, the 
IBRD found itself unable to provide as much useful assistance as 
was needed in those new states because IBRD loans carried market-
based interest rates. . . .  [I]t was against this backdrop that the IDA 
was established in 1960 as a companion to the IBRD—yielding the 
two institutions we now call the World Bank—to provide cheaper 
money through “soft loans” available to LDCs.  At about the same 
time (between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s), the IADB, the 
AfDB, and the AsDB were formed as regional sources of 
development financing, and all three of these regional MDBs sooner 
or later developed the same authority to make “soft loans” that the 
IDA makes. 
 The EBRD represents a third generation in the evolution of the 
MDBs.  This institution, formed about four decades after the IDA 
and the earliest of the regional MDBs, introduced several novel 
features into the operations of the MDBs.  Instead of prohibiting any 
consideration of political factors, as the charters of the earlier MDBs 
do, the charter of the EBRD expressly adopts a political mandate 
requiring the institution to take concrete steps to assist the countries 
 
9. See FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 44-46.  I first discussed this “generational” 
character of the MDBs about a decade ago.  See Head, Supranational Law, supra note 2, at 636, 
641-44. 
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of its operations—originally a handful of Eastern and Central 
European states newly released from the Soviet sphere of influence 
and now a couple of dozen states reaching from Central Europe 
across to Central Asia—in making their transition from Communist 
political control to an embrace of “the principles of multiparty 
democracy [and] pluralism.”  The EBRD Charter also included two 
other types of mandate absent from the charters of the earlier MDBs.  
Its economic mandate requires the EBRD “to foster the transition 
toward open market-oriented economies” in its countries of 
operation.  Its environmental mandate requires the EBRD to 
“promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and 
sustainable development.” 
 The establishment of the EBRD was a blatant manifestation of a 
trend that had already begun in the other MDBs.  It was a trend 
toward using the MDBs as instruments of global policy guidance or 
influence—or what I would call global policy regulation.  This trend 
is exemplified by the gradual expansion of MDB operations into 
policy-based lending [described above] and by the wide variety of 
policies and initiatives they have adopted. . . .  [These] policies and 
initiatives address environmental protection, indigenous peoples, 
involuntary resettlement, governance, corruption, public 
participation, gender issues, and poverty reduction. 
 Given these developments, I believe the MDBs should be regarded 
as having been transformed from financial institutions into 
regulatory agencies—that is, into agencies involved in global policy 
“regulation.”  They still carry out development banking functions, of 
course, but those banking functions have increasingly become 
instruments for achieving regulatory aims.10 
The above synopsis of the international financial institutions, even with 
my “three-generations” portrayal of the MDBs in particular,11 is still too brief 
to capture fully the tumultuous changes that have buffeted the IFIs in their 
relatively short lives.  I find it instructive to picture all the IFIs 
(metaphorically) as a small fleet of specially-chartered service vessels that 
have been designed and built to provide a limited set of services to the 
commercial and fishing boats that operate on a very large lake in a wilderness 
area.  The service vessels, anchored at strategic spots on the lake, provide 
supplies, navigation assistance, storage facilities, and a few other services for 
the few private boats that ply the waters of the lake.  However, as the years 
pass, great changes occur: the number of private fishing and commercial boats 
increases dramatically, the fish stocks in the lake diminish due to overfishing 
and pollution caused by increased exploitation, other service vessels are 
launched on the lake to provide additional services to the commercial and 
fishing boats there, changes in climate patterns surrounding the lake cause 
heavier winds and rougher waters, and even more remarkable changes—
 
10. FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 45-46. 
11. The IMF could be viewed as being in the first generation, and as having changed over 
time just as its sister organization, the IBRD, has since they both were created in 1944. 
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earthquakes and volcanic eruptions—also occur.  In the face of these 
developments, the original specially-chartered service vessels find themselves 
under considerable stress: they are being asked to provide a wider range of 
services (even including rescue operations) to a larger number of clients in an 
increasingly hostile environment—all without any significant overhaul of the 
vessels themselves or shift in their positions on the lake.  The changes in the 
“world” of specially chartered vessels seems overwhelming. 
The IFIs face analogous changes in the world in which they operate.  Two 
earlier observers of IFIs have written books examining some of those 
tumultuous changes.  One of the books, The IMF in a Changing World, was 
written in 1986 by an IMF official.12  The other book, The World Bank in a 
Changing World, consisted of three volumes published starting in 1991.13  (It 
is from those titles that I drew the heading for this subsection: “The IFIs in a 
Changing World.”)  Since the time those books were written, of course, the 
world has changed still more.  Let me offer some illustrations of the types of 
political, economic, and legal changes that the IFIs have had to respond to 
since the first of them (the IMF and the IBRD) were established: 
1940s: 
•  The IMF and the IBRD are established. 
•  A new organization—the United Nations—is established, with a focus 
on political and military cooperation. 
•  The international human rights movement is kicked off with the 1948 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. 
•  The Cold War begins, freezing most progress toward international 
cooperation on military issues and poisoning the working atmosphere at the 
U.N. Security Council. 
1950s: 
•  By this time, the U.S. Marshall Plan has largely displaced the IBRD as 
a chief financier of the reconstruction of post-war Europe. 
•  A tidal wave of newly independent countries starts emerging from the 
termination of (official) European colonialism. 
1960s: 
• That tidal wave of newly independent countries continues. 
•  International human rights efforts continue with the adoption of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), 
 
12. See MARGARET GARRITSEN DEVRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD, 1945-85 
(1986). 
13. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD—
SELECTED ESSAYS (three volumes) (1991-2000). 
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and with the adoption and coming into force of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”). 
1970s: 
•  The oil crises, triggered by effective OPEC oil cartels, bring havoc to 
the economies of economically developed countries. 
•  Further progress on human rights is made with the entry into force of 
the two human rights treaties mentioned above—the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
•  The international environmental movement is kicked off with the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on Environment and Development. 
1980s 
•  The debt crisis erupts with the announcement by Mexico and Brazil 
that they are unable to service their debt obligations. 
•  The Berlin Wall falls, presaging the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
1990s 
•  The Soviet Union collapses, leaving capitalism (market-based 
economics) as the economic model with nearly-universal acceptance. 
•  Further steps are taken in the environmental protection movement with 
the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. 
•  The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is established following the 
completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
•  A string of national and regional economic crises, most notably the 
Asian financial crisis, rocks the world economy and forces multilateral 
corrective action. 
2000s 
•  Anti-globalization forces, emboldened by the popular demonstrations 
against the WTO in Seattle just before the turn of the century (November 
1999), gain strength, pressuring all the IFIs for change. 
•  The Doha Round of trade negotiations, aimed at further liberalization 
of trade and investment rules, founder on several issues (especially agricultural 
subsidies) and seem near collapse. 
B. Law, Power, and a View of History 
But why law?  In the words of a take-off on a famous Tina Turner song of 
the 1980s,14 “What’s Law Got to Do With It?”15  When push comes to shove, 
 
14. According to Wikipedia (a website I would not trust for authentication of more 
important information than this), the song What’s Love Got to Do With It? was written by Terry 
Britten and Graham Lyle and recorded by Tina Turner as part of the album Private Dancer, 
released by Capital Records in 1984.  The single went straight to the top of the Billboard Hot 100 
in September 1984 and remained there for three weeks. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
What’s_Love_ Got_to_Do_with_It_(song). 
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aren’t the operations of the IFIs driven by raw political power and the 
economic strength that gives certain states that power?  Doesn’t this view best 
explain, for example, why the government of the United States has such 
influence in the World Bank, as reflected in the fact that every World Bank 
president since the creation of the institution has been American? 
Perhaps so, but I wish to look beyond the point when push comes to 
shove.  I wish to look instead at the point when a sense of urgency over the 
risks facing the global economic system triggers a new round of multilateral 
cooperation. 
If you think I am naïve in this respect, then I think you are forgetting 
history.  We must recall that twice in the twentieth century the sense of 
urgency over the risks facing the world did trigger remarkable new rounds of 
multilateral cooperation.  The first incident followed World War I, the horrors 
of which prompted the creation of the League of Nations in hopes of avoiding 
future conflicts of such magnitude.  The fact that these hopes were not realized 
does not detract from the significance of the attempt, just as the fact that a 
baby’s first effort to walk ends in short-term failure does not elicit cries of 
derision from family and friends. 
The second incident followed World War II.  Building on the League of 
Nations model, the allied nations emerging from that second terrible conflict 
created a cluster of new international institutions—the United Nations to 
handle matters of international peace and security and the Bretton Woods 
institutions to address economic matters.16 
 
15. These alternative lyrics (partially reprinted below) have been written by my colleague, 
Professor Richard E. Levy, and performed by our own KU faculty-led “Moody Bluebooks” rock 
band for several years in our annual Pub Night bash: 
What’s Law Got to Do With It? 
You must understand that a blue book exam makes my pulse react 
And it ain’t no thrill when you’re under the grill, have a heart attack 
It’s sadistical pathological 
And I try to ignore that it means more than this, Oh ... 
What’s law got to do, got to do with it? 
What’s law but an optical illusion 
What’s law got to do, got to do with it 
Who needs a class when a class brings confusion 
Now you might feel abused when you’re hit by the screws of the Socratic game 
And your brain cells are dead from the stuff that you’ve read, it all seems the 
same 
It’s hypocritical, it’s wholly cynical 
But whatever it is it is getting to me, Oh ... 
What’s law got to do, got to do with it? 
What’s law but an optical illusion 
What’s law got to do, got to do with it 
Who needs a class when a class brings confusion 
16. The two institutions emerging from the Bretton Woods conference—the IMF and the 
IBRD—were to be joined by a third institution, the International Trade Organization (“ITO”).  
However, the ITO was never established and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) acted in lieu of the ITO for over forty years until the establishment of the WTO.  For 
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We still live in a warring world, and it is entirely possible that the level of 
conflict will escalate again to the point at which the international community 
(or the key players in it) will once more opt for dramatic multilateral efforts to 
address that conflict.  Indeed, I believe the world faces many more threats now 
than at any previous time in human history simply because there are so many 
humans now and they are closer to each other, both literally and figuratively.  
The risk of environmental disasters, the threat of an unprecedented world 
pandemic, and the possibility of chaos emerging from the combination of 
crushing poverty and incompetent governance—each of these would be 
sobering enough in isolation; but our world today faces them all. 
Therefore, I see it as altogether plausible that efforts at multilateral 
solutions—similar to those we have seen in the last century—might be sought 
in coming years.  As in the past, such solutions could take the form of rules 
and institutions designed to facilitate our efforts to converse, to negotiate, to 
cooperate, to find common ground, and to survive as a civilized species.  This, 
then, is my answer to the question “what’s law got to do with it?”: 
notwithstanding the continuing influence that raw power, with its greed and 
ambition born of ignorance and arrogance, will naturally exert in global 
economic relations, law also will continue to have an influence as well.  Hence 
it behooves us to consider legal aspects of the IFIs and their operations. 
Before identifying specific issues that I consider noteworthy in that 
regard, let me offer one further observation about the view of history that 
colors the account I have given above concerning the importance of law in 
international economic relations.  Mine is admittedly an optimistic view of 
history and of humanity’s future.  Unlike a fundamentalist religious view—
either that of the fundamentalist Christians or the fundamentalist Muslims (two 
groups of people whom I regard as equally misguided by anti-intellectual 
fervor)—my view does not rest on divine intervention or supernatural powers 
or on some goofy idea of “rapture” transporting us heavenward but instead on 
the prospect that a growing appreciation of our shared humanity, accompanied 
by sustained efforts to turn technological advantages to our common benefit, 
can help us survive and prosper.  I believe most people in the world are no 
worse off , and many are better off, than their ancestors were, and that 
advancements we have seen in standards of living, especially among females 
and the poorest classes in LDCs, can be continued (even against the heavy 
waves of ever-increasing world population) if we try hard enough. 
C. A Menu of Issues and Questions 
In section II of this Article, I identify and briefly discuss eight specific 
issues relating to the role of law and lawyers in IFIs.  For convenient reference, 
I have given each one of them a shorthand label.  I list them here, and for each 
one I pose a question that captures some central elements of the issue. 
 
details on these matters, which are related to the subject of our symposium but lie beyond its 
scope, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 46-56. 
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• Faithfulness to IFI Charter Limitations.  Question: Are the IFIs acting 
lawfully within the parameters of their charters, or are they instead engaging in 
“mission creep”—that is, acting ultra vires by engaging in operations not 
expressly prescribed in their charters?  (This issue is addressed in part II.A, 
below.) 
• Legality in IFI Charter Interpretation.  Question: What limits, if any, 
apply to an IFI’s authority to interpret and apply the provisions of its charter?  
(This issue is addressed in part II.B, below.) 
• IFIs and “Ambient” International Law.  Question: To what extent, if at 
all, do general rules of international law—that is, customary international law 
and treaty law beyond their charters—apply to IFIs?  (This issue is addressed 
in part II.C, below.) 
• IFI Conditionality.  Question: Is IFI conditionality (under which IFIs 
will lend to countries only if they adopt certain economic and financial 
policies) really legal, both in principle and in application, or does it violate the 
national sovereignty of the IFI member countries?  (This issue is addressed in 
part II.D, below.) 
• IFI Financial Integrity.  Question: How does the legal integrity of 
IFIs—that is, their proper adherence to applicable legal rules and principles—
bear on IFIs’ financial integrity and strength?  (This issue is addressed in part 
II.E, below.) 
• IFIs and Progressive Development of International Law.  Question: 
What role, if any, should IFIs play in the progressive development of 
international law—by promoting, for example, new rules on accountability and 
good governance?  (This issue is addressed in part II.F, below.) 
• IFIs and Judicial Review.  Question: What steps, if any, should be taken 
to put in place more extensive and objective forms of “judicial review” in the 
IFI context, to help determine whether those institutions have acted 
consistently with the policies that they have announced?  (This issue is 
addressed in part II.G, below.) 
• The Roles of Lawyers in IFIs.  Question: What is the proper role of IFI 
lawyers (that is, their own institutional legal counsel) in IFI operations—for 
example, should they be “watchdogs” or “lapdogs”—and how far, if at all, 
should their duty extend outside the walls of the IFI that engages them?  (This 
issue is addressed in part II.H, below.) 
II. THE ROLE OF LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW IN IFI OPERATIONS 
A. Faithfulness to Charter Limitations 
One of the criticisms leveled at IFIs in recent years is that they are 
engaged in “mission creep”—that is, that they are not acting lawfully within 
the parameters of their charters.  This “mission creep” criticism takes 
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somewhat different forms depending on whether it is directed at the IMF or at 
the World Bank and other MDBs, but in all cases the criticism reflects some of 
the historical points I raised above.  In the face of extreme political, economic, 
and legal changes in the world, the IFIs have not remained static but rather 
have modified and expanded their operations.  For example, the IMF 
underwent important changes in its course in the 1980s with the emergence of 
the debt crisis and in the 1990s when the IMF started giving direct attention to 
“governance” issues and crisis management (most dramatically, with the Asian 
financial crisis).  As a result of these developments, the IMF now, according to 
many of its critics, has extended its operations into areas in which it has no 
authority to act. 
In order to appreciate fully the “mission creep” criticism, it is important to 
see the distinction, illuminated by Professor Daniel Bradlow between (1) those 
critics who argue that “the major problem with the IFIs is the way they have 
gone about expanding their mission rather than the mere fact that they have 
chosen to expand their mission”17 and (2) those critics who oppose any mission 
creep and who “argue that the IFIs’ ‘mission creep’ is tending to politicize the 
organizations in ways that will ultimately undermine their efficacy.”18  This 
distinction could be abbreviated as separating those critics who say “not this 
mission creep” from those who say “not any mission creep.”19 
For example, some critics claim that the World Bank has become far too 
broad and scattered in its focus, and hence less effective in its operations, 
because it has responded to every policy fad that has come along.20  One result 
of this looseness, it is claimed, has been an expansion of the World Bank’s 
purposes and operations into areas in which it has no authority under its 
charters.21  According to its critics, this adventure into ultra vires activity—
getting involved, for example, in judicial reform, micro-credit, women’s rights, 
 
17. Daniel D. Bradlow, Should the International Financial Institutions Play a Role in the 
Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 695, 
709 (2002) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Bradlow-I]. 
18. Id. at 710. 
19. The critics who say “not any mission creep” might be further divided into those who 
complain that mission creep is wrong as a matter of law (because it constitutes ultra vires action) 
and those who complain that mission creep is wrong as a policy or a practical matter.  For 
purposes of this Article, only the first of those—“legal mission creep”—is of interest. 
20. This criticism was made effectively a few years ago by a former World Bank official.  
See Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (Jan.-Feb. 2001) 
(asserting that “[b]y now, [the World Bank’s] mission has become so complex that it strains 
credulity to portray the bank as a manageable organization”). 
 My wife and I, having moved to the country recently and started gardening again, wonder if a 
more appropriate term for Ms. Einhorn to have introduced might have been “mission squash”—
not to suggest that the World Bank’s mission has been squashed at all but rather to reflect the 
phenomenon that anyone who has ever raised garden squash surely has encountered:  a small, 
slender, attractive fruit emerging from a delicate bloom expands without notice (sometimes 
overnight) into a gargantuan life form staring up from where it squats in the soil, too heavy to 
move and utterly impossible to use or (heaven forbid) give away. 
21. Technically, the World Bank operates under two charters—the IBRD charter and the 
IDA charter.  See supra notes 5 and 6. 
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and poverty reduction—has left the World Bank and the other MDBs too broad 
and too shallow.  They are gripped, the critics complain, by “policy 
proliferation” or “policy paralysis,” so something has to change to get them 
back on their proper (narrow) track.22 
In my view, the “mission creep” criticism fails, at least in the current state 
of affairs.  I believe the IFIs have acted within the limits of their charters, 
although just barely. 
As for the IMF, I believe Professor Bob Hockett—another participant in 
our symposium—has satisfactorily laid to rest the complaint that that 
institution has acted ultra vires in delving into such areas as “governance” 
issues and crisis management.  Hockett has explained that the pertinent IMF 
charter provisions are quite broad in their formulation—the result, Hockett 
explains, of an intentional effort by the persons drafting it “to incorporate a 
good deal of ‘creative ambiguity’ into the [charter’s] final draft in order to 
provide for future contingencies and to secure agreement.”23  Moreover, the 
IMF’s charter vests in the IMF itself all power to interpret its own charter—a 
matter that raises “a nearly irrebuttable presumption in favor of formal 
legality” of IMF action.24 
I find Professor Hockett’s analysis unassailable; from a legal perspective, 
the “mission creep” criticism fails when directed against the IMF.  Indeed, 
Hockett’s assessment addresses both sides of the distinction Daniel Bradlow 
draws between those critics who say “not any mission creep” and those who 
say “not this mission creep.”25  That is, Hockett has explained both (1) why it 
is appropriate for the IMF to adapt to changing circumstances in general, and 
(2) why the specific direction that the IMF has taken in expanding the scope of 
its attention is both legal and necessary. 
I believe the same analysis applies in respect of the World Bank and the 
regional MDBs.  As I noted earlier, the MDBs may be regarded as comprising 
three “generations”: the IBRD (emphasizing mainly the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II) constituted the first generation; the IDA and the 
first three of the regional development banks (all created around 1960) 
constituted a second generation, responding to the rising importance of the 
LDCs; and the EBRD (created in 1990) constituted the third generation, in 
which three mandates—economic, political, and environmental—were given to 
that institution.  With the emergence of each new generation, the MDB(s) of 
the previous generation assumed an increasingly broader role.  By the time the 
IDA was established in 1960, the IBRD had already shifted its focus to the 
 
22. For further detail on the “mission creep” criticism as applied both to the IMF and to the 
MDBs, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 166-67, 120.  For extensive citations to 
representative contributions to the literature in this area, see id. at 233-234, 246-247. 
23. Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to “Mission Creep”: Defending the IMF’s 
Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 41 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 177-78 (2002). 
24. Id. at 180. 
25. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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developing world.  By the time the EBRD was established in 1990, all of the 
MDBs that preceded it had already taken on some aspects of policy regulation 
that were pressing hard against the outer limits of their charters.  Now all the 
MDBs have expanded their purview to include a very broad range of policies 
that the institutions and their borrowing members are to follow—including 
such issues as environmental protection, indigenous peoples, involuntary 
resettlement, governance, corruption, public participation, the role of women in 
development, and poverty reduction. 
Is this policy expansion, this “mission creep,” legally warranted?  I 
believe it is, for the same reasons that Professor Hockett has offered in 
rejecting the “mission creep” criticism in respect of the IMF.  The MDB 
charters, like the IMF charter, provide for self-interpretation.26  I shall argue 
below in section II.B that this power is not limitless, but it is undoubtedly 
broad.  And, more importantly, the MDB charter provisions themselves are 
also broad.  They are surely broad enough to permit the MDBs to give at least 
some attention to such issues as those I enumerated above—environmental 
protection and so forth—because any and all of these can have a bearing on the 
central objective of economic growth and development prescribed for all of the 
MDBs in their charters.27 
In sum, I find the “mission creep” criticism unpersuasive in the case of 
any of the IFIs, with perhaps one minor exception.  Within the last few years 
some of the MDBs have explicitly, and with much fanfare, announced what 
amounts to a shift in purpose—from economic development (as expressly 
prescribed in their charters) to poverty reduction,28 despite the fact that no such 
purpose is in fact mentioned (nor does the word “poverty” even appear) in any 
of the IFI charters. 
Aside from that exception, I believe the IFIs have been faithful to their 
charters, although just barely.  Any further significant expansion in the scope 
of IFI operations would, in my view, require charter amendments.  I favor such 
amendments, for reasons I shall explain below in section II.C. 
B. Legality and the Process of Charter Interpretation 
Having just asserted in section II.A above that the IFIs are not guilty—so 
far, at least—of “mission creep” from a legal perspective, I will offer some 
observations now on a closely related issue: what limits, if any, apply to an 
IFI’s authority to interpret and apply the provisions of its charter?  As noted 
above, each IFI charter includes an interpretation provision that empowers its 
 
26. For citations to the specific charter provisions providing such self-interpretation powers, 
see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 124 n.49. 
27. For citations to the specific charter provisions prescribing overall objectives of the 
MDBs, see id. at 124-25 n.50. 
28. For citations to recent pronouncements by the World Bank, the IDB, the AfDB, and the 
AsDB, as well as references to some commentary on this apparent shift in purpose, see id. at 125-
26 n.53. 
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governing board(s) to issue final rulings—not subject to external appeal—on 
the proper construction of the charter.  Article 60 of the ADB charter29 is 
typical: 
(1)  Any question of interpretation or application of the provisions of 
this Agreement arising between any member and the Bank, or 
between two or more members of the Bank, shall be submitted to the 
Board of Directors for decision. . . . 
(2)  In any case where the Board of Directors has given a decision 
under paragraph 1 of this Article, any member may require that the 
question be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall 
be final. . . . 
As Professor Hockett has observed in the context of the IMF, the power 
of charter self-interpretation raises “a nearly irrebuttable presumption in favor 
of formal legality” of IFI action.30  But is this really a carte blanche power? 
Let us consider this by examining an example.  Article 11 of the ADB 
charter authorizes the ADB to carry out its operations in several ways, 
including “by guaranteeing, whether as primary or secondary obligor, in whole 
or in part, loans for economic development participated in by the Bank.”  
Would it be within the scope of its authority for the ADB’s Board of Directors 
to issue a resolution declaring that Article 11 of the ADB charter permits the 
bank to issue “stand-alone” guarantees—that is, guarantees for loans in which 
the ADB does not itself have any financial participation?  A case of this sort 
arose a few years ago in the ADB,31 with some Board members urging that 
such “stand-alone” guarantees be authorized, partly on grounds that other 
MDBs engage in this form of financial assistance.  Would it have been 
appropriate for that position to prevail? 
My answer has both a policy element and a legal element.  As a policy 
matter, I believe an IFI should not play fast and loose with its charter 
interpretation powers, because to do so would, at least in the long run, 
engender both (i) a culture of undue nonchalance toward the rule of law within 
the institution and (ii) an institutional image among external evaluators that the 
IFI is comfortable stretching its powers beyond those expressly granted to it by 
the states that created it.  An external image of this sort could damage the 
reputation of the institutional on financial grounds—a matter that I address 
below in section II.E. 
As a legal matter, I believe it would not be within the authority of the 
ADB to declare that Article 11 of its charter permits the bank to issue “stand-
alone” guarantees.  For one thing, such a declaration would fly in the face of 
the rules of treaty interpretation prescribed in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna 
 
29. Citations to the charters of all the MDBs, including the ADB, may be found in FUTURE 
OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 30-31.  The texts of all the MDB charters may be found in 
appendices to that book, as well as on the websites of the organizations. 
30. See supra note 23. 
31. Details of the matter are summarized in an internal ADB book titled Annotated Guide to 
the ADB Charter (2001) (on file with author). 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.32  Whatever uncertainty there might be 
regarding the direct applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention to the ADB’s 
Board of Directors,33 it is beyond dispute that Article 31 represents a 
codification of customary international law.  As discussed below in section 
II.C, I believe the IFIs are, and should regard themselves as being, bound by 
rules of customary international law. 
To this customary international law argument I would add another legal 
ground for urging that it would not be within the authority of the ADB Board 
of Directors to declare that Article 11 of its charter permits the bank to issue 
“stand-alone” guarantees.  For many years, questions have arisen over the issue 
of “implied powers” of international organizations.34  It could be claimed that 
an international organization—such as the ADB in the case I have 
hypothesized above—can take certain actions that are not expressly authorized 
in the charter that establishes the organization and governs its operations.  The 
main legal impediment to attributing some “implied powers” to an 
international organization lies in the fact that such an organization is, by its 
very nature, a creature of delegated powers—delegated to it, that is, by the 
states that have created it—and that therefore the terms of its charter cannot 
appropriately be interpreted broadly without interfering with the sovereignty of 
those states.  Put more simply, it cannot be presumed that member states have 
surrendered to an international organization more of their sovereign powers 
than they have expressly authorized.35  Such a presumption would be 
especially inappropriate if the authority being claimed under an “implied 
powers” argument is in fact inconsistent with powers expressly granted in the 
organization’s charter.36  That would be the case in the circumstances I have 
hypothesized above: for the ADB Board of Directors to declare an implied 
power to issue “stand-alone” guarantees would be inconsistent with the 
language of Article 11(iv), which specifically authorizes the bank to issue 
guarantees for loans in which the bank participates. 
 
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, ¶1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”) 
33. The ADB itself, because it is not a state, is not even eligible to be a party to that Vienna 
Convention, although most ADB members are.  The other Vienna Convention on the law of 
treaties has similar provisions on treaty interpretation.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, art. 31, 
¶1, March 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, 562.  However, that 1986 treaty has not come into force yet; 
and even if it were, its provisions would not apply to a treaty that dates from twenty years earlier, 
as the ADB charter does.  See id. art. 4. 
34. For a summary on the question of “implied powers” of international organizations, see 
John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries’ Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment of the 
Third Amendment to the IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 592, 607-12 (1993). 
35. Id. at 608. 
36. See id. at 611 (pointing out that one of the fundamental limitations “inherent in the 
doctrine of implied powers is that no implied power can be inconsistent with powers expressly 
granted by the organization’s charter”). 
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Let me offer an example drawn from my own personal experience.  In the 
late 1980s, the IMF Legal Department was asked to give its approval to a 
proposition that it would be within the implied powers of the IMF to suspend 
the voting rights of a member country that failed to make payments due to the 
IMF under loans made to that country by the IMF.  The Legal Department 
declined to do that, insisting instead that imposition of such a suspension-of-
voting-rights sanction would require formal amendment to the IMF charter.  
The Legal Department’s view prevailed, and the formal machinery of charter 
amendment was set in motion, resulting ultimately in the Third Amendment to 
the IMF charter.37  In my view, this is an example of the lawyers in an IFI 
bringing their professional training and ethics to bear on an issue in which the 
integrity of the institution, and its adherence to a rule of law, was at stake. 
In sum, I believe that the charter interpretation authority found in the IFIs’ 
charters are limited in several respects.  Some of these are found in sound 
policy, and some are found in law.  The fact that the interpretation by an IFI’s 
governing board(s) is to be “final”38 in the judicial sense of not being subject to 
the review of some external agency does not mean that there are no 
ascertainable standards regarding treaty interpretation that should be applied in 
such cases, or that such cases lie totally within the discretion of the governing 
board(s) and are somehow exempted from the rule of law. 
C. The Applicability of “Ambient” International Law to IFIs 
My point in using the term “ambient” international law—a term I have 
not encountered before—is to identify rules of customary international law, 
including those that derive from widely accepted treaty provisions, that are part 
of the environment in which the IFIs operate.  Such rules would include rules 
of treaty interpretation, as referred to above in section II.B.  They would also 
include key norms concerning international human rights, international 
environmental protection, and international economic law that are binding on 
states—at least those states that are parties to widely accepted treaties on those 
topics. 
Are the IFIs bound by those “ambient” rules of international law?  The 
simple answer must be “no,” but that is too simple an answer.  As noted above 
in section II.B (in considering treaty interpretation rules), international 
organizations themselves are not eligible to become parties to most treaties, 
because most treaties anticipate participation only by states.  However, most 
states that are members of IFIs are also parties to the main multilateral treaties 
on human rights, environmental protection, and international economic law.  A 
representative list of these is given below (with dates of conclusion shown in 
 
37. For an account of this process, see generally Head, Third Amendment, supra note 34. 
38. As prescribed in the ADB charter provision cited earlier in this section, a question of 
charter interpretation may ultimately be sent to the Board of Governors, “whose decision shall be 
final.” 
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parentheses and approximate numbers of parties shown in brackets).39 
Treaties relating mainly to international economic relations: 
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [“GATT”] (1994) [15140] 
- Agreement on Agriculture (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the TRIMs Agreement) 
(1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (relating to 
customs valuation) (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 (relating to 
dumping) (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Rules of Origin (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Licensing Procedures (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM 
Agreement) (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Safeguards (1994) [151] 
- General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994) [151] 
- Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the 
TRIPs Agreement) (1994) [151] 
- Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (the DSU) (1994) [151] 
- Trade Policy Review Mechanism (1994) [151] 
- Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) [151] 
- OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (1997) [36] 
 
Treaties relating mainly to human rights and environmental protection: 
- Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) (1973) [169] 
 
39. Information shown here for the numbers of states that are parties to treaties is drawn 
from various websites and other sources.  I have made no attempt here to reflect nuances of 
participation, such as reservations that some states have made in respect of some treaty 
provisions.  The information is supplied for illustrative purposes. 
40. This number represents the current number of states that are members of the WTO.  In 
order to be a WTO member, a country must be a party to the GATT, as well as to the several 
other multilateral treaties emerging from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that concluded 
in late 1993.  Most of those treaties are listed here; the same number [151] is shown for each of 
them for the reason noted above. The last treaty on this list did not emerge from the Uruguay 
Round. 
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- Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985), and 
pertinent provisions of the Protocols thereto and of the Amendments to those 
Protocols [191] 
- Basle Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal (1989) [168] 
- Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) [188] 
- Climate Change Convention (1992) [189] 
- Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming (1998) [164] 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967) [152] 
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1966) [169] 
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979) [177] 
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) [192] 
Given the broad participation in these treaties41 by states that also are 
members of IFIs, what should be the attitude of the IFIs toward the norms set 
forth in those treaties?  I would offer three observations in this regard. 
First, the IFIs should not take action that requires states to act 
inconsistently with their obligations under those treaties.  Hence, for example, 
in its lending operations, an IFI should not impose loan conditions requiring a 
borrowing member country to impose a ban on the importation of certain 
manufactured goods so as to protect a local industry within the borrowing 
country, inasmuch as such behavior would almost surely put the member 
country in violation of its GATT obligations. 
That much is straightforward as to be simplistic, at least in the context of 
the example I just offered.  However, closer cases can arise.  Assume, for 
example, that an IFI requires, as part of the loan conditionality that it applies to 
a loan, that the borrowing member country reduce subsidies that the 
government has provided for many years to a large segment of the society.  
Depending on the circumstances, it might be argued that the required subsidy 
reduction forces the country to renege on its commitments under Article 11 of 
the ICESCR to provide an “adequate standard of living.”  The argument would 
be even more compelling if the subsidy-reduction requirement would have 
especially drastic effects on minorities that are to be protected under Article 27 
of the ICCPR or under some provisions of the 1967 Racial Discrimination 
Convention or the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).  In my view, IFIs should be 
especially wary of placing member countries in a conflicted position of this 
 
41. In addition to these key treaties, other sets of guidelines have also been developed and 
gained very broad acceptance by the international community.  These include guidelines on 
banking supervision, corporate governance, regulation of multinational enterprises, treatment of 
foreign direct investment, and other matters.  For details, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 
2, at 105.  The observations I make in the following paragraphs about the attitude that IFIs should 
take toward the treaties I have listed above would also apply to these non-treaty guidelines. 
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sort.  I believe they generally are careful in this regard. 
Second, IFIs should, in my view, encourage and facilitate member states’ 
adherence to the commitments they have made under such widely-accepted 
treaties as those listed above.  For example, an IFI should not only refrain from 
requiring a borrowing member country to impose an import ban that would 
contravene a country’s GATT commitment; the IFI should, where the occasion 
arises, insist through conditionality that the country remove any import bans it 
already has in place that would contravene its GATT obligations. 
Does that mean that the IFIs should be in the business of enforcing a 
whole range of treaty obligations that are not directly related to the IFIs’ 
lending program, including not only obligations of an economic nature (such 
as import bans) but also human rights or environmental-protection obligations?  
The answer, in my view, depends on the circumstances.  I agree with the 
distinction that Daniel Bradlow has made between enforcement and 
implementation of international legal obligations.42  The scope of 
“implementation,” under Bradlow’s distinction, involves having international 
financial institutions “us[e] their technical assistance and information gathering 
capacity”43 to collect data and share it with specialized agencies having 
subject-matter competence.44  An “enforcement” role, by contrast, would be 
much broader—involving, for example, loan conditionalities that would result 
in a suspension of financial assistance if the country acted in breach of its 
commitments.45  Using that distinction between implementation and 
enforcement, I would suggest that the IFIs should have an enforcement role in 
respect of the core obligations in the treaties listed above on international 
economic relations and an implementation role in respect of the core 
obligations in the treaties listed above on human rights and environmental 
protection. 
Third, I would go a step further than Bradlow has anticipated.  As I 
explained in some detail in a recent book, I would recommend amendments to 
the charters of the IFIs to incorporate by reference key provisions of such 
treaties as those listed above, with the requirement that member states wishing 
to continue their membership in the IFIs would need to adhere to those key 
treaty provisions.46  This would resemble the approach taken in the TRIPs 
Agreement47 emerging from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which 
incorporates by reference key intellectual property treaties.48  A principal 
 
42. Bradlow-I, supra note 17, at 728. 
43. Id. at 729. 
44. Id. at 715-16. 
45. Id. at 726-27 (discussing the possibility of using loan conditions to enforce international 
humanitarian law). 
46. See FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 106-10, 163-66. 
47. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
48. Id. art. 2. 
3- HEAD-FORMATTED.3.DOC                                                                     (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2008  2:48:56 PM 
214 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:2 
reason for this charter-amendment approach is that it would help overcome the 
complaint that the only method by which the IFIs currently apply legal norms 
from “ambient” international law is through conditionality, which obviously 
affects only those countries that borrow from the IFIs, and not the rich 
industrialized countries that are, in Bradlow’s terms, “supplier states” rather 
than “consumer states.”49  We might also refer to these as “norm-makers” and 
“norm-takers,” respectively. 
To summarize, I regard the proper relationship between the IFIs and 
“ambient” rules of international law to have these three elements: (1) IFIs 
should keep far away from imposing requirements that would force member 
countries to contravene obligations they have by virtue of their participation in 
other treaties; (2) IFIs should, in fact, take affirmative steps to facilitate 
member countries’ adherence to such obligations; and (3) in order to have a 
wider sweep of effectiveness, and particularly to help ensure that their 
“facilitating” measures will affect the rich developed countries as well as those 
countries that borrow from the IFIs, the charters of the IFIs should be amended 
to incorporate by reference the key provisions of several of the main treaties 
listed earlier in this section—not only those addressing economic and financial 
matters but also those dealing with human rights and environmental protection. 
D. Legal Aspects of IFI Conditionality 
Having touched slightly on the issue of conditionality in the preceding 
section, let us now turn more directly to it.  A central question regarding the 
legal aspects of IFI conditionality is this: Is IFI conditionality legal, both in 
principle and in application, or does it violate the national sovereignty of the 
IFI member countries? 
The conditionality practiced by the IMF and the MDBs has received 
intense scrutiny50 and is surely a familiar topic to all the participants in this 
symposium and to most readers of the papers emerging from it.  Therefore I 
shall give only an abbreviated description here. 
In providing financing to its member countries,51 the IMF almost always 
engages in conditionality.  Under conditionality, the IMF disburses money to a 
borrowing country only on a piecemeal basis (rather than in a single lump sum) 
and only if the country can demonstrate that certain economic and financial 
policies that the borrowing country’s government committed to in advance 
with the IMF are, in fact, being implemented and having the desired results.  
The types of policies that IMF conditionality often focuses on include such 
 
49. Daniel D. Bradlow, Rapidly Changing Functions and Slowly Evolving Structures: The 
Troubling Case of the IMF, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 152, 153 (2000) [hereinafter Bradlow-
II]. 
50. See FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 228-29, 241 (synopses of, and citations to, 
several works critical of conditionality as practiced by the IMF and the MDBs). 
51. For a survey of the various mechanisms and facilities the IMF uses in providing 
financing, see id. at 24-25. 
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rather obvious things as (1) a reduction in government spending and foreign 
borrowing, (2) regulation of the money supply to stop or forestall inflation, and 
(3) steps to strengthen banking supervision in order to protect depositors from 
being bilked out of their savings by dishonest or incompetent bank managers. 
IMF conditionality also can, depending on the circumstances, reflect 
policies for liberalizing a country’s trade and investment laws, encouraging 
privatization of government-owned entities or operations, and strengthening 
tax laws and collection—all with an eye to improving a country’s overall 
economic stability and performance.  “Since the late 1990s, ‘in growing 
recognition of the adverse impact of poor governance (and the resulting 
corruption) on economic efficiency and growth, the IMF has turned its 
attention to a broader range of institutional reforms and governance issues in 
the reform programs it supports,’”52 and therefore has reflected such issues in 
its use of conditionality.  Measures to improve governance include 
strengthening legal frameworks and applying international standards of 
accounting and auditing. 
IMF conditionality is governed by guidelines adopted most recently in 
2002.53  The main legal foundation for such conditionality is located in Article 
V, Section 3 of the IMF charter, which directs the IMF to “adopt policies on 
the use of its general resources,  . . . that will assist members to solve their 
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary 
use of the general resources of the Fund.”  The “adequate safeguards” phrase 
appears also in Article I(v), which identifies as one of the IMF’s purposes “[t]o 
give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards.” 
The conditionality practiced by the MDBs resembles that of the IMF, at 
least in some respects.  It is important, however, to distinguish between the two 
main types of loans made by the MDBs.  The bread-and-butter work for the 
MDBs has traditionally been to provide financial intermediation for specific 
development projects, usually for constructing some form of infrastructure or 
productive operation, such as roads, irrigation systems, rural health clinics, 
wastewater treatment systems, port facilities, power plants, schools, 
transmission lines, fertilizer plants, and other physical structures.  The loans 
the MDBs provide for such projects are typically made on a reimbursement 
basis, so that funds are transferred from the lending MDB to the borrower only 
against expenditures as they are actually incurred by the borrower or 
implementing agency, rather than as balance-of-payments loans of the type 
 
52. Id. at 25 (citing a 2000 IMF publication on governance and anti-corruption initiatives). 
53. Id. at 72-73 (explaining the four principles reflected in the new guidelines: (1) the need 
to enhance the borrowing country’s “ownership” of the policy reforms, (2) the need to reduce the 
number of conditions, (3) the need to tailor the policy programs, and hence the content of the 
conditionalities, more closely to the borrowing country’s circumstances, and (4) the need to 
improve clarity in the specification of conditions). 
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provided by the IMF.54 
However, the MDBs also make another type of loan: “policy-based” 
loans.  In these cases, funds are provided by the MDBs to borrowing countries 
to support (and in return for) the adoption by those countries’ governments of 
certain economic and financial policies that the MDBs consider appropriate 
and beneficial.  For example, the guidelines on such policy-based lending as 
carried out by the ADB require that the lending will be based on a “broad-base 
sector reform and development plan that will enhance sector efficiency and 
performance, comprising in particular policy changes and institutional 
development.”55  Consistent with these guidelines, the ADB has made policy-
based loans for numerous purposes—for example, financial sector reform in 
several of its member countries.56 
In the first of these two types of MDB operations—project lending—the 
MDBs typically impose numerous conditions relating to the government’s 
commitment of budgetary resources to support the project being financed, the 
need for environmental protection measures in project implementation, various 
reporting requirements, and so forth.  In the second category—”policy-based” 
lending—the MDBs impose conditions that operate and sometimes even look 
like conditions in IMF financing arrangements: they call on the borrower to 
implement specified economic or financial policies favored by the MDBs in 
order for the disbursement of loan proceeds to continue. 
Are these various forms of IFI conditionality legal, or do they violate the 
national sovereignty of the IFIs’ member countries?  In particular, does IFI 
conditionality violate the principle of self-determination?  My answer to both 
of these questions, as I have explained more fully in another context,57 is “no.”  
I offer three reasons.  First, states are under no legal obligation to accept the 
conditions of an IFI loan, for the simple reason that states are under no legal 
obligation to seek an IFI loan in the first place—or, indeed, to become a 
member of any IFI.  Second, there is likewise no legal obligation on the MDBs 
to provide financing for whatever projects their member governments propose.  
International law contains no generally accepted “right to development 
assistance” under which a country is legally entitled to receive financial 
assistance from another country or from an international financial institution.  
A large number of initiatives have been taken by which massive transfers of 
financial resources have in fact been made by rich countries (and by the IFIs) 
 
54. FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 32. 
55. Asian Development Bank, Operations Manual: Bank Policies—Program Lending, § D4 
(as issued Apr. 16, 1997, renumbered as of October 2003), at ¶ 3, available at 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/OMD04_29oct03.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2007). 
56. FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 33.  One such financial sector reform program 
supported by a policy-based ADB loan was the one I worked on several times in the 1990s in 
Mongolia, whose government and central bank were urged by the ADB (and some other IFIs) to 
undertake sweeping reforms of the country’s banking and central banking laws and regulations. 
57. Id. at 136-38 (discussing in more detail the points summarized below). 
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to LDCs—the IDA itself is a prime example of this—but these are thus far 
only the result of special negotiation, not a general requirement of international 
law.  Third, the principle of self-determination is, in my view, much weaker 
and sketchier than some commentators would suggest.  If it amounts to 
anything more than just a slogan, it surely cannot mean that a government can 
adopt economic and financial policies that are proven failures (or, even more 
absurdly, that a government can be subsidized through “soft-loan” support in 
pursuing such policies)—especially if the government itself has not emerged 
from what has been referred to as “internal” self-determination involving free 
and meaningful elections. 
E. Legal Integrity and Financial Integrity 
The key question I have identified above on this topic is: “How does the 
legal integrity of IFIs—that is, their proper adherence to applicable legal rules 
and principles—bear on IFIs’ financial integrity and strength?”  I raise this 
legal question because my experience suggests to me that many persons, 
including even some IFI officials, do not appreciate the close relationship 
between legal integrity (that is, faithful adherence to written rules or the “rule 
of law”) and the financial strength that the IFIs enjoy. 
Let us examine this issue by considering the mechanisms by which the 
IFIs obtain the resources they use in making loans (and providing other 
services) to their member countries.  In general, there are two such 
mechanisms.  The first, used by all the MDBs in making their “hard” loans 
(that is, loans carrying market-based interest rates), is to borrow on public 
financial markets.  In this respect they behave much like ordinary private 
sector businesses or financial intermediaries: the MDBs issue various types of 
debt instruments (mainly medium-term and longer term bonds) that investors 
purchase because of the attractive rates and low risk that they present; and the 
MDBs use the proceeds from those borrowings to make (hard) loans to 
borrowers in their member countries. 
Second, all of the IFIs (that is, the MDBs and the IMF) rely on another 
mechanism for getting resources: soliciting contributions from member 
country governments.  Such contributions provide the funds for “soft” or 
“concessional” loans.  As noted above, such “soft” loans as offered by MDBs 
often carry no interest at all (or a tiny amount of interest) and have long 
maturities.  The IMF also engages in “soft” lending through its Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (“PRGF”).58 
Both of these two mechanisms for obtaining resources—borrowing on 
financial  markets and securing contributions from member country 
governments—make the IFIs’ adherence to written rules important.  Take the 
first mechanism: the successful marketing of MDB debt securities on financial 
markets requires strong ratings from such rating agencies as Moody’s or 
 
58. For a summary of the PRGF, see id. at 24. 
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Standard & Poor’s.  In order to obtain such strong ratings for its debt 
instruments, an MDB needs to show financial integrity and prudence as 
evidenced by good policies and practices relating to borrowing limits, lending 
limitations, accounting standards, investment of funds, and so forth.59  If an 
MDB were to act in breach of any of its stated financial policies—such as the 
ADB charter requirement that the ADB’s total amount of its outstanding 
“loans, equity investments and guarantees . . . should not at any time exceed 
the total amount of its unimpaired subscribed capital, resources and surplus 
included in its ordinary capital resources”60—this could (and should) serve as a 
red flag to the rating agencies and trigger a drop in the ratings provided by 
those agencies; and this in turn would increase that MDB’s borrowing costs 
because its securities would need to carry higher interest rates (or other more 
favorable terms) in order to attract purchasers of the securities. 
A similar logic applies to the other mechanism for obtaining resources.  In 
general, member governments will be reluctant to provide contributions for 
“soft” lending operations by the MDBs or by the IMF if those institutions 
appear to be playing fast and loose with their charter provisions or to give little 
attention to accepted rules and policies applicable to the organizations. 
In sum, financial strength is influenced importantly by legal integrity.  In 
order to best serve the intended beneficiaries of IFI operations, the IFIs 
themselves must consistently follow, and be seen to be following, the terms of 
pertinent charter provisions and pertinent policies adopted by the IFIs.  What 
charter provisions and policies are “pertinent” for these purposes?  I would 
suggest that practically all charter provisions and policies are “pertinent,” 
because any ultra vires action—that is, any departure by an IFI from the 
written rules that govern it—could trigger concern on the part of rating 
agencies and member governments that the IFI is taking a relaxed attitude 
toward the rule of law.  For example, if the IMF Executive Board were to 
impose on an IMF member country a sanction not provided for in Article 
XXVI of the IMF charter, or if the ADB Board of Directors were to declare 
that Article 11 of the ADB does in fact permit that organization to provide 
“stand-alone” guarantees— to use two illustrations offered above—rating 
agencies and member countries asked to contribute to “soft” loan resources 
might well question whether the IMF or the ADB can be trusted to adhere to 
other rules and procedures binding on them. 
Let me emphasize how this point about “legal integrity and financial 
integrity” is related to the earlier discussion of “mission creep.”  As explained 
above in section II.A, I believe the IFIs have not engaged in “mission creep,” 
at least as a legal matter, so far (unless we consider the recent rhetorical claims 
by IFIs that poverty reduction is a “purpose” despite the fact that no such 
 
59. For examples of several such policies—specifically, lending criteria and limitations, 
borrowing limits, and investment guidelines—as practiced in the ADB, see Head, Asian 
Development Bank, supra note 2, at ¶ ¶105, 184, 189. 
60. ADB Charter, art. 12.1. 
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purpose is in fact mentioned in any of the IFI charters61).  It is vitally 
important, however, that the IFIs be alert to the dangers of “mission creep.”  
The discussion in this section, showing how legal integrity bears on financial 
strength, underscores why IFIs must play by the rules—that is, that they 
carefully avoid taking action that is beyond the scope of their authority as set 
forth in their charters and other official policies.  It is partly for this reason that 
I have proposed charter amendments that will formally modify the powers and 
responsibilities of the IFIs and thereby overcome any current concerns 
regarding “mission creep.”62 
F. Judicial Review of IFI Operations 
All of the IFIs are self-contained in the sense that they do not report to or 
fall under the authority of any other entity, either national or international.  
Their governing boards have authority to interpret their charters, as noted 
above.  This self-contained nature of the IFIs has led to the criticism that they 
are unaccountable because they are not subject to any outside judicial review.63 
In recent years, however, several of the IFIs have taken initiatives to 
permit some form of review of their actions.  In the case of the World Bank, 
for example, such review function is carried out by the World Bank Inspection 
Panel, established in September 1993.  The World Bank Inspection Panel, 
comprising three individuals acting with substantial independence from the 
World Bank’s management, has as its primary purpose “to address the 
concerns of people who might be affected by [World Bank] projects and to 
ensure that the Bank adheres to its operational policies and procedures in the 
design, preparation, and implementation of such projects.”64 
Steps have also been taken in this same direction by other IFIs.  For 
example, the ADB has had an Inspection Policy for over a decade,65 and that 
policy has recently been reviewed and expanded66; the IADB has an 
 
61. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
62. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
63. For further details in this regard, and related criticisms, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, 
supra note 2, at 119. 
64. THE WORLD BANK, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 
10 YEARS ON 3 (2003).  Information about the World Bank Inspection Panel is also available at 
http://www.inspection.panel.org. 
65. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ADB’S INSPECTION POLICY: A GUIDEBOOK (1996), 
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Inspection/default.asp. 
66. In June 2002, the ADB began holding regional meetings to obtain input from NGOs, 
civil society, and private sector interests regarding the effectiveness and improvement of the ADB 
inspection mechanism.  FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 163 n.152.  In May 2003, the 
ADB replaced its inspection mechanism with a new accountability mechanism, which consists of 
a consultation phase and a compliance review phase.  See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, REVIEW 
OF THE INSPECTION FUNCTION: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ADB ACCOUNTABILITY 
MECHANISM (2003), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/ADB_Accountability_Mechanism/ 
ADB_accountability_mechanism.pdf. 
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Independent Inspection Mechanism67; and the AfDB now (as of recently) has 
an Independent Review Mechanism.68  The corollary to these in the IMF is the 
Independent Evaluation Office (“IEO”) established in July 2001 in order “to 
conduct objective and independent assessments of issues of relevance to the 
mandate of the IMF.”69  The structures vary, of course, among these various 
“inspection,” “accountability,” “review,” and “evaluation” mechanisms. 
In my view, the development in recent years of these various mechanisms 
is praiseworthy but inadequate.  I would prefer to see more extensive and 
objective forms of “judicial review” in the IFI context—that is, review by a 
more independent, more judicial, and therefore more externally trustworthy 
system.  In particular, for the World Bank and the other MDBs, I propose the 
establishment of an International Tribunal for Multilateral Development 
Banks.  Such a Tribunal would amount to an expansion of the inspection 
panels that the MDBs have established in order to determine whether those 
institutions have acted consistently with the policies that they have announced.  
Such a tribunal would also have appellate jurisdiction over the governing 
boards of the MDBs in matters of charter interpretation.  Judges for the 
tribunal could be selected mainly by the MDBs themselves.  Providing for such 
judicial review would introduce some checks and balances of the sort that most 
national governmental structures have, by adding to the executive and 
legislative functions (carried out by the MDBs’ management and governing 
boards, respectively) a judicial function responsible for checking the legality of 
the exercise of the other two functions.  The International Tribunal for 
Multilateral Development Banks would accept complaints from individuals or 
groups alleging that an MDB had acted inconsistently with its own charter or 
its own announced policies and principles. 
As for the IMF, I suggest a revision in the structure of the IEO to make it 
more genuinely independent of the IMF Executive Board.  Such revisions 
might include (i) providing for appointment of one or more IEO panel 
members by some entity (or entities) other than the IMF Executive Board, (ii) 
providing procedures by which cases alleging IMF misconduct could be 
 
67. In 1994, the IADB established the Independent Investigation Mechanism to investigate 
formal complaints on whether the IADB fails to follow its policies in the design, analysis, or 
implementation of IADB-financed operations.  For more information on the IADB inspection 
mechanism, see http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/iii/independent_invest/independent_invest.cfm? 
language=english (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
68. In June 2004, the AfDB established its Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) to 
ensure that the AfDB complies with its own policies and procedures.  For public sector projects, 
the IRM reviews compliance with all AfDB operational policies and procedures.  However, for 
private sector projects, the IRM reviews compliance only for social and environment policies.  
For more information on the AfDB IRM, see http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid= 
473,5848220 &_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).  Professor Daniel 
Bradlow has been involved in assisting the AfDB in this regard.  See Daniel Bradlow, Study on 
an Inspection Function for the African Development Bank Group (Nov. 2003, on file with 
author). 
69. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 60 (2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2003/eng/index.htm. 
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brought more directly before the IEO without review of the IEO’s work 
program by the IMF Executive Board, (iii) creating a position of 
“ombudsman” to assist with the process, (iv) providing for open hearings, and 
(v) requiring that the IMF’s management or Executive Board issue a public 
response to IEO recommendations.70 
G. IFIs and the Progressive Development of International Law 
Another key question that I identified above is this: What role, if any, 
should IFIs play in the progressive development of international law—by 
promoting, for example, new rules on accountability, transparency, good 
governance, or special treatment for less developed countries? 
I use the term “progressive development of international law” in the sense 
in which that term is used in Article 13(1)(a) of the United Nations Charter, 
which authorizes the U.N. General Assembly to make recommendations for 
the purpose of “encouraging the progressive development of international 
law.”  The same term is used in Article 15 of the Statute of the International 
Law Commission, which identifies the “progressive development of 
international law” as “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which 
have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law 
has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of states.”71 
Should the IFIs be involved in any activities of this sort?  In my view, the 
answer is “yes.”  To some extent, of course, the IFIs are already involved 
through the promotion of rules and standards on a variety of subjects, including 
corporate governance, money laundering, environmental protection, 
accounting standards, and treatment of foreign direct investment.72  There 
 
70. For further details regarding some of these proposals, see FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra 
note 2, at 98.  As indicated there, some of these proposals draw on the work of other observers.  
See, e.g., Carol Welch, The IMF and Good Governance, in 3 INTERHEMIPSHERIC RESOURCE 
CENTER & THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, Foreign Policy in Focus 3 (Tom Barry & Martha 
Honey eds.,1998), available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/25/054.html; see also 
Bradlow-II, supra note 48, at 158. 
71. Statute of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/ CN.4/4/Rev.1 (1962), at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
72. For some examples of how the World Bank or other MDBs promote rules and standards 
in these areas, see, e.g., The World Bank News & Broadcast, World Bank Releases Largest 
Available Governance Data Source, Press Release No. 2009/63/WBI, Sept. 15, 2006,  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21050333~menuPK:34
465~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (World Bank initiatives on public 
governance standards); The World Bank News & Broadcast, World Bank Continues Leadership 
In Fight Against Corruption, Report Shows, Press Release No. 2007/213/INT, Feb. 6, 2007, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21205078~menuPK:34
465~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (World Bank initiatives against fraud 
and corruption); The World Bank News & Broadcast, World Bank Advances on Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Work Plan, Press Release No. 2007/138/WB, Nov. 10, 2006, http://web. 
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21124299~menuPK:34465~pageP
K:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (World Bank initiatives on governance and anti-
corruption standards); The World Bank News & Broadcast, European Investment Bank and 
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would seem to be little question that such activities fit easily within the 
purposes of the IFIs as prescribed in their charters,73 even taking into account 
the “political prohibition” provision that appears in most of the IFI charters.74  
The more important issue is whether it is appropriate as a policy matter for the 
IFIs to participate actively in the “progressive development of international 
law.” 
I believe it is appropriate.  We find ourselves in an age in which economic 
law and policy have taken center stage, and the IFIs provide the institutional 
leverage needed to bring about more effective regulation and coordination of 
that economic law and policy at the global level.  Given the obvious and 
increasing need for rules that facilitate the effective management of economic 
issues at the national level (where more economic regulation will continue to 
take place for the foreseeable future), and given the influence that IFIs can 
exert through their lending operations, it strikes me as altogether fitting that the 
IFIs take a lead role in the progressive development of international law, at 
least in areas that relate to economic management and regulation. 
I have argued elsewhere in favor of expanding the IFIs’authority75 in 
 
World Bank Join Forces to Tackle Climate Change, Press Release No. 2007/280/SDN, Mar. 20, 
2007, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21264121~menu 
PK:34465~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (European Investment Bank and 
World Bank initiatives to finance environmental protection); The World Bank News & 
Broadcast, MDBs, Business and Governments: Financing Clean Energy, Press Release No. 
2007/270/SDN, Mar. 13, 2007, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/ 
0,,contentMDK:21256600~menuPK:34465~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.htm
l (MDBs’ initiatives to finance environmental protection).  One of my close friends, Herbert 
Morais, has written widely on the role of IFIs in establishing and applying standards.  One of his 
articles on this topic was presented at a symposium here at Kansas University several years ago.  
See Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. 
Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 779 (2002).  For some of his work on IFIs and human rights, see 
generally Morais, supra note 2. 
73. For example, Article I(iii) of the IBRD charter states as one of the IBRD’s purposes 
“[t]o promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of 
equilibrium in balances of payments.”    Likewise, Article 1, § 1 of the IADB charter provides 
that that institution’s purpose “shall be to contribute to the acceleration of the process of 
economic and social development of the regional developing member countries [of the IADB].”    
The IMF charter provisions on that organizations purposes, found in Article 1 of that charter, are 
similarly broad, using such phrases as “[t]o promote international monetary cooperation” and 
“[t]o facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade.” 
74. The “political prohibition” provision in the IBRD charter appears in Article IV, § 10:  
“The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they 
be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.  
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions . . . .”  Similar provisions appear 
in the IDA charter at Article V, § 6; the IADB charter at Article VIII, § 5(f); the AfDB charter at 
Article V, § 38(2); and the ADB charter at Article 36.2.  A similar but narrower provision appears 
in Article IV, § 3(b) of the IMF charter, which states that in its surveillance activities the IMF 
should “respect the domestic social and political policies of its members.” 
75. See FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 155-66 (suggesting reforms to the MDBs’ 
operations under which those institutions would insist on the adoption of certain rules and 
principles by their member countries); see also id. at 96-108 (suggesting reforms to the IMF’s 
operations under which that institution would insist on the adherence by all countries to certain 
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order to take advantage of the strength those institutions have.  Such expansion 
of authority would require amendments to the IFIs’ charters that would both (i) 
vest new powers in them and (ii) impose more safeguards and checks on their 
operations.  One consequence of these changes should be that the IFIs’ 
influence would extend not just to borrowing member countries but also to 
those member countries that do not borrow from the IFIs and that thus have 
heretofore been, as a practical matter, largely exempt from the influence that 
the IFIs exert through conditionality.76  For example, I have proposed 
amendments to the IFI charters that would link some portion of each member 
country’s voting power to its economic and financial policies and 
performance,77 and that would make a country’s continuing membership in the 
IFIs conditional on that country’s acceptance of various treaties and guidelines 
on a range of other issues, including human rights and environmental 
protection.78 
In all these ways, the IFIs could contribute to the “progressive 
development of international law.”  The reforms necessary to authorize the 
IFIs to undertake some of these activities would raise troubling issues for some 
observers, and indeed I see many such reforms as impossible in today’s 
political climate, particularly in the United States.  I believe, however, that the 
day will come fairly soon when circumstances in the world economic and 
political climate will make dramatic changes both necessary (even in the eyes 
of currently skeptical observers) and feasible.  I would prefer that we have 
considered in advance what those changes should be. 
H. The Status and Roles of Lawyers in IFIs 
My list of key topics relating to the role of law in IFIs comes to a close 
with some observations regarding the lawyers and legal departments that serve 
those institutions.  This is a topic that will resonate loudly with several of the 
participants in our symposium, because they bring to our proceedings many 
decades of aggregate experience as practicing lawyers serving as legal counsel 
to IFIs: Ross Leckow is currently the Deputy General Counsel at the IMF; 
John Taylor was General Counsel of the EBRD; John Boyd combines many 
years of experience in the ADB Office of General Counsel with many years of 
experience in other offices of that institution; and two others of our participants 
also have some experience practicing law within the IFIs. 
Beyond doubt, IFI lawyers have played valuable roles in the 
establishment and operation of these institutions.  In my view, the future of the 
 
minimal standards in several areas, including quality of governance). 
76. For a description of this “symmetry in obligations” problem, under which borrowing 
member countries are subject, through conditionality, to requirements that the non-borrowing 
member countries can largely ignore, see id. at 67-68 (IMF) and 120-21 (MDBs). 
77. See id. at 100-01 (in the context of the IMF) and 161-62 (in the context of the MDBs). 
78. See id. at 105-07 (in the context of the IMF) and 158, 164-66 (in the context of the 
MDBs). 
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IFIs will turn in important measure on the independence, integrity, and 
ingenuity of such lawyers in coming years. 
1. Watchdogs or Lapdogs? 
I surmise that we would get a wide range of answers if we were to pose 
this general question to top executives in various IFIs: “What is the proper role 
and status of lawyers within this institution?”  The status of lawyers varies in 
numerous ways among legal systems and cultures.  For example, a Japanese 
view would likely differ from an American or European view.  From my 
experience at the ADB—which has strong Japanese influence for several 
reasons (including the tradition by which all ADB presidents have been 
Japanese nationals)—I have concluded that the Japanese view typically sees 
lawyers as facilitators whose main function (shared with other officials, of 
course) is to assist the executive in accomplishing the executive’s goals.  While 
this function is by no means foreign to an American lawyer, the typical 
American lawyer would regard his or her role to be larger than that, 
encompassing a “watchdog” (or “guardian”) function reflecting loyalty not 
predominantly to the executive but to the entity as a whole—whether that 
entity is a private company or a public institution.  For that reason, I believe 
the typical American lawyer would be most comfortable reporting to the 
highest level of authority within the entity and less comfortable reporting to a 
non-legal intermediary (for example, a vice president or a director of 
administration), who might filter the lawyer’s views or balance them against 
other factors in a way that the American lawyer would find entirely 
inappropriate. 
In my view, several of the IFIs have organizational structures that do not 
adequately value and validate the role of lawyers in the institutions’ operations.  
In the ADB, for example, the General Counsel reports not to the President or to 
the Board of Directors but instead to one of the four Vice-Presidents, as do six 
other officials (budget director, secretary, treasurer, etc.).79  Likewise, the 
IADB structure places the General Counsel relatively far down in status, 
reporting to a Vice-President rather than to more highly-placed officials—
Executive Vice President, President, and Board of Executive Directors.80  In 
the World Bank, the General Counsel has a higher organizational status, 
serving also as a Senior Vice President.81 
I acknowledge the fact that I reflect my own biases in recommending that 
the American approach (as I have summarized it above) be followed in all the 
 
79. For information on the ADB organizational structure, see http://www.adb.org/About/ 
ADB_Organization_Chart.pdf. 
80. For information on the IADB organizational structure, see http://www.iadb.org/ 
aboutus/iv /organizational.cfm?language=english. 
81. For information on the World Bank’s organizational structure, see http://site resources. 
worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf.  For information on the organizational 
structure in the IMF (showing the Legal Department reporting directly to the Managing Director 
and Deputy Managing Directors), see http://www.imf.org/external/np/ obp/orgcht.htm.  
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IFIs, so that IFI lawyers be regarded as watchdogs and not as lapdogs.82  
However, my bias comes not so much from the fact that my own legal training 
comes from England and the United States as from the answer I suggested at 
the beginning of this article to the question, “What’s Law Got to Do With It?”  
I believe law—and in particular a constant and evident faithfulness to the rule 
of law—has a great deal to do with the future and success of the IFIs. 
2. Transparency and IFI Legal Opinions 
In the context of the IFIs, “transparency” involves making available to the 
public a very broad range of information about what the IFIs have done, are 
doing, and propose to do.  I have outlined elsewhere the various elements of 
transparency that I believe IFI operations in general should involve.83  In what 
specific ways, though, does the move toward greater transparency bear on the 
work of IFI lawyers?  I shall suggest one here. 
In my view, all legal opinions issued by the General Counsel (or an IFI 
lawyer serving temporarily in the place of the General Counsel) to a governing 
board of the IFI should be accessible electronically to the public.  Beginning in 
the early 1990s, the World Bank general counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, began 
making publicly available the content of many legal opinions he had issued—
not in their original form but in the three-volume set of books I referred to 
earlier in this article.  Those books, under the general title of The World Bank 
in a Changing World, set forth numerous legal views and explanations drawn 
in part from internally-generated legal opinions.84  In keeping with the 
dramatic moves taken recently toward greater transparency in all the IFIs, it 
should not be necessary to have some special “external” (and perhaps 
sanitized) publication of such legal opinions.  Instead, given the significance of 
the IFIs to the world’s economic management, such official views by an IFI’s 
head lawyer on the legal aspects of the IFIs’ operations should, in my view, 
automatically be made public upon issuance. 
I would go even further in this respect, to suggest that all the charter-
based legal opinions prepared within the legal departments of IFI should be 
made public.  In 2001 I prepared for the ADB two books—they are titled 
Guide to the ADB Charter and Annotated Guide to the ADB Charter—to 
provide a legal history (in both an abbreviated version and a comprehensive 
version) of the ADB as it evolved through the written interpretation and 
 
82. According to Wikipedia (whose authenticity is probably adequate for this purpose), the 
word “lapdog” can refer not only to a dog small enough to sit conveniently on a person’s lap but 
also to “a person who is very easily controlled, such as a ‘yes’ man.” 
83. See FUTURE OF THE GEOS, supra note 2, at 156 (referring to the MDBs, and focusing 
on such things as making accessible to the public the records of discussions and decisions at 
meetings of governing boards); id. at 97 (referring to the IMF, and focusing on such things as 
establishing and publishing an Operations Manual and formal statements regarding the IMF’s 
mandate and its respect for domestic social and political policies of member countries). 
84. See SHIHATA, supra note 13, at vol. 1, p. 53 (explaining that the contents of the book’s 
chapter on “governance” issues was drawn from a legal memorandum by the author as World 
Bank general counsel). 
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application of the provisions of the ADB charter by lawyers in the ADB’s 
Office of General Counsel.  Such lawyers are public servants; they are part of 
the international civil service.  Therefore, in my view, their official functions 
should be open to some extent to public scrutiny.  Publishing their legal 
opinions—not every memorandum they write, but just that small proportion of 
their memoranda that offer considered opinions on the application of the 
fundamental constituent document(s) of the institution—would reflect their 
status as international civil servants.  It would also serve an educative purpose 
by informing an interested public how the terms of public documents (IFI 
charters) are to be construed and used.  So far, however, the two books I 
mentioned above, explaining and detailing the ADB charter, have not been 
made public. 
3. Building Legal Capacity 
I began this section by asserting that “the future of the IFIs will turn in 
important measure on the independence, integrity, and ingenuity of [IFI] 
lawyers in coming years.”  I wish to turn to the third of these aspects: 
ingenuity.  One of my long-term colleagues in the area of international 
economic law and development is John Boyd.  He is also one of the 
participants in this symposium.  One of Mr. Boyd’s observations in surveying 
the many profound needs of the developing world is that one of the most 
important tasks of development is legal development.  Many countries face the 
rigors of globalization with dismally weak legal systems, whether gauged in 
terms of the quality of legal education, the honoring of legal rights, the 
enforcement of legal judgments, the expertise of legal personnel (advocates, 
notaries, judges, legislators), the dissemination of legal rules and information, 
or the general acceptance of the rule of law in government and society.  These 
weaknesses stand squarely in the way of durable progress toward economic 
improvement. 
How, and by whom, can these legal deficiencies be addressed and 
overcome?  Only, I believe, through dramatically increased funding for 
projects aimed directly at building legal capacity in those countries where the 
legal deficiencies are deepest; and only by persons who themselves are lawyers 
with an appreciation for the critical role that a modern and stable legal system, 
reflective of the traditions of a society, can play in facilitating economic 
development in that society.  Without going into detail here, I would propose 
that lawyers in IFI are best positioned to help design and manage those legal-
capacity-building projects.  Such lawyers already have, by virtue of the 
environment in which they work and the cross-cultural legal training that this 
environment has given them, a deep reservoir of expertise and experience from 
which to draw.  The other main ingredient they will need is ingenuity, in order 
to see how best to persuade their IFI colleagues and managers of the value of 
legal capacity-building projects.  Considerable work in this area has already 
been done.85  More is needed. 
 
85. For some examples drawn from the ADB, see information appearing at 
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III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Earlier in this article I focused briefly on multilateralism.  In particular, I 
said that I see it as altogether plausible that new efforts at multilateral 
solutions, similar to the efforts made immediately following World War II, 
might be sought in the coming years; and on that basis I suggested that a public 
discourse over legal aspects of the IFIs and their operations is timely and 
important.86 
In concluding this article, I wish to return briefly to the topic of 
multilateralism, and to sound a cautionary note.  Despite my view that we 
might see new efforts at multilateral solutions-and that we should prepare 
ourselves for them by discussing how to improve the IFIs-I do not consider it a 
sure thing that multilateralism will in fact be the path ultimately taken for 
dealing with increasing global tensions.  Indeed, I see in some of the 
occurrences of recent years a growing ideological conflict over how such 
global tensions should be handled.  Multilateralism is under attack.  This 
ideological conflict has many dimensions, but the dimension that concerns me 
the most, and that bears most directly on the IFIs as well as the WTO, relates 
to global economic development.  As I have characterized it elsewhere,87 I fear 
that a Global Development War has now erupted, a war whose outcome will 
have wide implications—especially institutional, environmental, and economic 
implications—for our world. 
What do I mean by referring to a “Global Development War”?  To put it 
in its starkest form, it may be seen as a war over the developmental ideology 
that is to be adopted and followed in the coming years, and particularly 
whether to accept or reject an ideology of liberal, intelligent, participatory, 
multilateral, and sustainable human development. 
I shall not try here to explain precisely what I mean by that high-sounding 
phrase—”an ideology of liberal, intelligent, participatory, multilateral, and 
sustainable human development.”  Suffice it to say that such an ideology was 
at work in the establishment of the global economic organizations over the 
years starting in the 1940s, as well as in many of the initiatives taken in recent 
years to update and reform those institutions in hopes of keeping pace with 
changing economic and political conditions in the world.  As should be clear 
from several of my comments in this article, I believe those initiatives for 
update and reform have been too few and too modest in several important 
 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/VAN/R65-01.pdf (referring to technical assistance dating 
from 2000 for legal capacity building in Vanuatu); http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/ 
VIE/34055-VIE-TACR.pdf (referring to a legal-capacity-building technical assistance project in 
Vietnam that was completed in January 2006); http://www.adb.org/Governance/gov_ publications 
.asp#legal_justice (referring to the ADB’s legal reform efforts more generally). 
86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (especially two paragraphs before and two 
paragraphs after that note). 
87. See generally JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR: A 
CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE WTO  (forthcoming 
2008). 
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respects; and yet I see considerable promise in the IFIs (as well as in the WTO) 
if further efforts are made. 
No such efforts will be made, however, if the underlying ideological 
support for the global economic organizations, and the goals they seek to 
achieve, crumbles.  I see signs of such a crumbling, and this is what makes me 
concerned that we—that is, the world’s societies collectively, and especially 
those of us in the rich, “developed” world—might currently be losing that 
Global Development War. 
Let me sketch out how this might be happening.  There are three ways.  
First, we seem in some respects to be failing to expand and improve on the 
multilateralism of the past.  Just as a bicycle rider will typically wobble and 
then fall over unless the bicycle is moving forward at some reasonable speed, 
so the process of multilateralism must be moving forward at some reasonable 
pace in order to stay on track.  Recent developments reveal that instead of 
moving forward briskly with the process of multilateralism—for example, by 
expanding and improving on the Uruguay Round trade liberalization exercise 
with far-reaching initiatives—we are permitting a serious slowdown in the 
pace of multilateralization, as reflected recently in the breakdown of the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations. 
A second way in which I fear we might be losing the Global Development 
War is closely related to the first.  In some respects there is an actual 
unraveling of the multilateralism that emerged after World War II.  That is, in 
certain ways the bicycle rider seems to have stopped pedaling entirely, 
dismounted from the bicycle, and started walking backwards.  Why?  Because 
of doubts both about her destination (which direction she is going) and about 
the bicycle as a means of transport (that is, about how she is getting there).  A 
great crescendo of criticism has cast doubt on the global economic 
organizations, claiming not only (i) that the ideological foundation on which 
they rest (like the bicycle’s destination) is misconceived but also (ii) that deep 
institutional failings require that those global economic organizations be 
abandoned (shut down), at least in their present form, on grounds that they are 
unworkable vehicles for getting to any desired destination. 
What is wrong with this picture?  What is wrong is that many of the 
criticisms of the global economic organizations are simply off-base because 
they rely on outdated information or fundamental misunderstandings of what 
those organizations are, why they were created, how they are structured, and 
how they operate.  Like Gresham’s Law, under which bad money runs out the 
good,88 the invalid criticisms threaten to run out the very legitimate ones.  In 
 
88. Gresham’s Law, named after Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579), is stated simply as 
“bad money drives good money out of circulation.”  Despite its attribution to Gresham, the “law” 
actually has earlier origins, as both ancient and medieval references were made to the tendency of 
lightened, debased, or worn coins to have assigned to them the same official value as coins 
containing greater quantities of precious metal.  This tendency would lead to “bad” coins (those  
possessing a relatively low precious-metal content) being offered in routine payments, while 
“good” coins were withdrawn into hoards, exported, or reduced through clipping or “sweating” to 
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other words, one way in which we are losing the Global Development War is 
by allowing invalid assertions—some of which I have discussed briefly in 
earlier portions of this article—to influence our policy-makers (and ourselves) 
in determining whether, and how, to stick with the multilateral approaches 
established sixty years ago to manage international economic relations. 
A third way in which I fear we might be losing the Global Development 
War comes as a direct consequence of the two trends I have identified above.  
Because there is a slowdown in the process of multilateralization, and even a 
reversal in some respects, ideological and institutional alternatives are starting 
to gain influence.  Just as nature abhors a vacuum, likewise any drop in 
commitment to improving and expanding upon the multilateral ideology and 
institutions that were so strong following World War II will naturally attract 
competitors.  One such competitor is the sort of bilateral assistance that China 
has started to engage in recently, lending money to governments in Africa and 
elsewhere on terms that are devoid of such conditions as economic policy 
reform, participatory project design, good governance, or other issues that the 
World Bank in particular has increasingly paid attention to in recent years.89 
Why does any of this matter?  My view in a nutshell is this: The 
ideological and institutional developments I have identified above—our failure 
to move forward briskly with an improved and expanded multilateral approach 
in the context of the global economic organizations, plus the supplanting of 
that approach with an inferior one—all lead toward the largest problem of all: 
we are losing ground in the effort to meet the great challenge of our time.  That 
challenge, on which our collective future depends, is to bridge the dangerous 
and desperate gap in living conditions of human beings around the world. 
I close by directing my thanks again to the Journal for sponsoring this 
Symposium, and to my fellow participants for making it a success.  We have, I 
think, made a useful contribution to a much-needed thoughtful public discourse 
over the role and future of the IFIs. 
 
an intrinsic value no greater than that possessed by their “bad” counterparts.  For further 
information, see http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/selgin.gresham.law. 
89. Several reports during 2007 drew attention to China’s expanding practice of bilateral 
assistance.  See, e.g., Can We Help You? How China is Wooing a Poor Neighbour, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 29, 2007, at 14 (reporting on an April 2006 announcement by China’s prime minister that 
China would provide Cambodia with US$600 million, equivalent to almost the entire 
international aid budget for that country, for roads, dams, and other projects, all apparently with 
no strings attached); see also Moisés Naím, Help Not Wanted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, p. A10 
(reporting on China’s offer to rebuild Nigeria’s entire rail network, a project amounting to about 
US$9 billion, with “no bids, no conditions and no need to reform”); see also William Wallis, 
China’s Pledge of $20bn for Africa Will Eclipse Other Donors, FIN. TIMES, May 18, 2007, at 1 
(noting that making such loans without conditions will provide no particular incentive to make 
policy changes to help assure the ability of the borrower to meet its repayment obligations).  
Other observers emphasize another potential danger to such loans:  some of them represent “tied 
aid” of the sort referred to earlier, under which the funds can be used only for purchase of 
Chinese goods and services.  See, e.g., Jamil Anderlini, China Ties $5bn Aid to Africa, FIN. 
TIMES, June 26, 2007, at 1. 
